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Incommensurability as Vagueness: a
Burden-Shifting Argument∗
Luke Elson (luke.elson@reading.ac.uk)
Forthcoming in Theoria
Abstract. Two options are ‘incommensurate’ when neither is better than
the other, but they are not equally good. Typically, we will say that one
option is better in some ways, and the other in others, but neither is better
‘all things considered’. It is tempting to think that incommensurability is
vagueness—that it is (perhaps) indeterminate which is better—but this
‘vagueness view’ of incommensurability has not proven popular. I set
out the vagueness view and its implications in more detail, and argue
that it can explain most of the puzzling features of incommensurability.
This argument proceeds without appeal to John Broome’s ‘collapsing
principle’.
When we compare options with respect to some value, it often seems that neither of
two options is better, and they are not precisely equally good. If this is not an illusion,
the options are incommensurate (or ‘superhard’ or ‘incomparable’), and none of the
trichotomous comparisons (betterness, worseness, equality) determinately holds be-
tween them.1
Incommensurability raises a number of puzzles. How do incommensurate options
compare, if at all? And what are the constraints on rational choice between them? If,
as I shall argue, incommensurability is vagueness, then vagueness in what we have
reason to do is pervasive, not a mere theoretical curiosity. Rational choice under in-
commensurability is choice when it is indeterminate which of the trichotomous com-
parisons applies, rather than choice when none of them does.
∗For discussion and comments, I am indebted to Dorit Bar-On, Ruth Chang, Ram Neta, John
Roberts, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philip Stratton-Lake, Susan Wolf, to au-
diences in Charleston, Chapel Hill, Eindhoven, and Reading, and to several anonymous reviewers.
1I use the term ‘incommensurability rather than ’incomparability’ has in recent years been the more
popular term, because on the vagueness view the options are comparable, albeit it is indeterminate
which comparison holds between them.
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There are many classic examples of incommensurability. Who is more creative,
Mozart or Michelangelo? Which is more impressive, Stonehenge or Salisbury
Cathedral? Which is a better career, law or music?2
Such examples can mislead, if they imply that it is a rareified phenomenon or that it
only affects significant choices. It can arise in almost any choice or evaluative com-
parison involving several virtues or ‘dimensions’ of goodness. Our main example is
rather prosaic:
Holiday Choice. Katie lives in Sweden, and has decided to go on holiday
to North America. This will be a significant expense for her. She has two
salient options. Churchill in Manitoba is one of the best places in the
world to see polar bears; it is exciting but expensive, not least because
the roads don’t go that far North. Florida beaches are less exciting, but
make for a cheaper trip.
It is clear which holiday is better along each dimension (price, excitement, and so
on). But for Katie the important question is altogether more difficult—which holiday
is better for her all things considered? You may have the judgement (perhaps after
some tweaking of the case) that each has something to be said for it, and that neither
is overall better than the other.
So might they be precisely equally good? That this is not (always) the case may be seen
with a ‘Small Improvement Argument.’3 Call Churchill- the trip which is precisely
similar to Churchill, but 5 Swedish kronor (about 50 Euro cents) more expensive. We
are supposing that:
(1) Churchill is better than Churchill-.
(2) Churchill is neither better nor worse than Florida.
The suggestion is:
(2a) Churchill and Florida are equally good.
But (2a) together with (1) implies that Churchill- is worse than Florida. But the con-
siderations that support (2) also seem to support a similar claim about Churchill-:
(3) Churchill- is neither better nor worse than Florida.
Denying (3) seems absurd, especially in light of (2). When comparing holidays along
many dimensions, how could an arbitrarily small price increase ‘tip the balance’ in
this fashion? This could happen, but only under very special circumstances. (3) gains
support from the thought that had we encountered not Churchill but Churchill- first,
2The examples are due to Chang (2002) , Broome (1997) and Raz (1986) , respectively.
3For classic discussion of such arguments, see Sousa (1974).
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we would have judged that trip neither better nor worse than Florida. So claiming that
Churchill and Florida are equally good does not resolve the puzzle, but merely shifts
it to (3).
Eliminativists about incommensurability will claim that in such cases, one of (1)–(3)
must be false, and we are likely in the grip of evaluative ignorance. It is clear that
sometimes we do not know which of the trichotomous comparisons applies. Elimina-
tivists claim that this is so in all apparent cases of incommensurability. Donald Regan
defends such a thesis of ‘complete comparability’ concerning the Moorean good.4
If eliminativism is incorrect and there is some genuine incommensurability, then it is
not merely ignorance:
Incommensurability. a and b are incommensurate with respect to some
value V if and only if: it is neither determinately true that a is Ver than b,
nor determinately true that b is Ver than a, nor determinately true that a
and b are equally V, and the comparison is not silly or malformed.5
This engenders a certain phenomenal instability or air of paradox. Even in prosaic
examples such as Holiday Choice, it can be difficult to simultaneously entertain the
thoughts that together make up the verdict that the options are incommensurate.
Rational choice between incommensurate options—such as that faced by Katie—is
also puzzling. We may wish to say that she can choose either holiday, and in general
it is intuitively plausible that one may choose either of two incommensurate options:
Arbitrary Choice Thesis. When two options are incommensurate with
respect to some value, insofar as one is choosing in accord with that value,
one may permissibly choose either.
After all, if a is no better than b (with respect to V), then how could it be wrong
(with respect to V) to choose b over a? And yet a similar point can be made against
the thesis: how can it be permissible to choose either if they are not equally good?
Whether the Arbitrary Choice Thesis is true or false, it requires either justification or
an error theory.6
Unrestricted Arbitrary Choice engenders value-pumping, where a sequence of permit-
ted choices amounts to an impermissible choice. This is because incommensurability
4Regan (1997), p. 129.
5The final clause sets aside cases of ‘noncomparability’, akin to “what’s louder, my chair or this
paragraph?” I won’t try to cash out this clause more precisely, but I trust that its meaning is tolerably
clear.
6Here and throughout, I assume a simple connection between the deontic and the evaluative: an
option is permissible iff it is at least as good as all other options. I’m grateful to Philip Stratton-Lake
for discussion of this point.
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is not transitive: a may be incommensurate with b, and b incommensurate with c, but
a better than c. In Holiday Choice, Churchill is incommensurate with Florida, and
Floria incommensurate with Churchill-, but Churchill is better than Churchill-.
Arbitrary Choice implies that it is permissible for Katie to choose Florida over
Churchill, and then Churchill- over Florida. But this sequence of choices amounts to
the impermissible choice of Churchill- over Churchill.
I will defend the vagueness view: if the holidays are incommensurate, it is indetermi-
nate which is better for Katie.7 Perhaps, for example, Katie lacks determinate prefer-
ences and this indeterminacy ‘infects’ the evaluative comparison.
The argument is not that the vagueness view succeeds where other views fail. It is
instead burden-shifting: we have good reason to believe that evaluative vagueness is
anyway present, and that it can explain the main features of incommensurability, so
competing views which posit a sui generis evaluative phenomenon face an explanatory
burden. Given the theoretical parsimony of the vagueness view, we would need some
reason to reject it as an account of incommensurability.8
In the next section, I sketch the main competing accounts of incommensurability. I
argue that the success or failure of the vagueness view has come to be wrongly tied
to the success or (likely) failure of a famous argument for it, due to John Broome.
The independent plausibility of the view has been overlooked, and is my focus for the
remainder of the paper.
I will often speak of evaluative comparisons between two ‘options’ or ‘items’; these
are intended to be read interchangeably. I will also be discussing both (permissible
or impermissible) actions and (correct or incorrect) judgements about the relative
value of options. A theory of incommensurability should both tell us what it is for two
options to be incommensurate, and which choices are permissible between incommen-
surate options. These two questions are obviously related, but they do not amount to
the same thing. We might hope that an answer to the second will be explained by
an answer to the first; on the other hand, our philosophical intuitions about permissi-
bility seem rather firmer than those about the nature of incommensurability, so they
will inform our theorising about that issue question. (For an example of this, see the
discussion of Chang’s argument, below.)
7Here and throughout, I put this entirely in terms of indeterminacy, but almost everything can be
recast in terms friendly to epistemicism about vagueness. There is a taxonomic complication, however.
If incommensurability is vagueness and vagueness is ignorance, then it is unclear whether this should
count as a form of the eliminativism discussed above.
8I’m grateful to John Broome for suggesting this interpretation of my argument.
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1 Trichotomous Incomparabilism
The ‘orthodox’ account of incommensurability is Trichotomous Incomparabilism.
When two options are incommensurate, each of the trichotomous comparisons
determinately fails to apply, and they are trichotomously incomparable:
Trichotomous Incomparability. a and b are trichotomously incompara-
ble with respect to some value V when it is false that a is Ver than b, and
that b is Ver than a, and false that a and b are equally V. Nevertheless, a
and b are properly compared in terms of their Vness.
This can be fleshed out in quite different ways. Joseph Raz argues that often, no com-
parison applies in such cases, and the two options are simply incomparable.9 Ruth
Chang argues that the options are comparable even when trichotomously incompara-
ble: she defends the existence of a fourth comparison she calls ‘parity’, which holds
in (at least some cases of) incommensurability. For Chang, the trichotomous compar-
isons do not exhaust the available comparisons. More formal versions of a parity ac-
count have been worked out by Wlodek Rabinowicz and Erik Carlson, respectively.10
It may seem like an abuse of terminology to group two such distinct views under the
same heading, particularly because for Chang—but not for Raz—items may be incom-
mensurate but nevertheless comparable (via the relation of parity). This, she claims,
allows for an answer to the decision-theoretic questions: ‘many choice situations in
which justified choice seems precluded [ie, choice between incommensurate options]
are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason.’11
But orthodox views agree on this much: when two options are incommensurate, they
are (at least sometimes) trichotomously incomparable, so each of the trichotomous
comparisons determinately fails to apply. This can happen even though the options in
question are ‘of the right sort’ to be compared by the value in question.
Whether or not the adherent of the vagueness view regards this as incoherent—for
example, whether or not she thinks it a conceptual truth that to be properly compared
by some value is for that value to render one of the trichotomous verdicts—it is a
substantial and counterintuitive committment, and one that needs to be justified. I
will argue that the orthodox view is deeply unparsimonious.
9Raz (1986).
10For parity, see Chang (2002). See also Gert (2004), Rabinowicz (2008), Carlson (2010), Elson
(2014b) and Andersson (2015a).
11Chang (2002), p. 666.
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2 The Vagueness View
In contrast, the vagueness view gets by with rather limited resources: the trichotomous
comparisons, and the possibility of vagueness in their application.
The phenomenon of vagueness has two main ‘marks’. In borderline cases, a vague
predicate neither clearly applies nor clearly fails to apply.12 In classic examples: there
are clear heaps of sand, clear non-heaps, and borderline cases, which seem to be ‘nei-
ther a heap nor not a heap’; there are clearly bald men, clearly non-bald men, and
borderline-bald men.
The other mark is the paradox of the sorites, which trades on the apparent truth of
tolerance claims such as ‘one hair couldn’t make the difference between being bald
and not-bald’, to conclude—paradoxically—that someone with ten thousand hairs is
bald, starting from the premise that someone with five hairs is.
The dominant theories of vagueness are that it is indeterminacy, and that it is igno-
rance. For indeterminists, it is (semantically or metaphysically) indeterminate how
many grains are required for a heap, and whether a given borderline-heap is a heap.
It is neither determinately true nor determinately false that a borderline-bald man is
bald.13
Here is the vagueness view:
The Vagueness View of Incommensurability. a and b are incommen-
surate with respect to some value V if and only if: it is indeterminate
whether a is Ver than b, or b is Ver than a, or a and b are equally V.
It is an interesting question how genuinely evaluative vagueness could arise. One can
see how a more broadly dispositional or counterfactual account might go: if the better
holiday for Katie is what she would choose under ideal circumstances, for example,
then any indeterminacy in this counterfactual will engender indeterminacy in which
holiday is better for her.14 I set aside this question here, and argue below that evaluative
predicates are vague in a way which engenders incommensurability.
If Chang and Raz are the canonical opponents of the vagueness view, then John
Broome is its longstanding ally. He has famously argued that incommensurability
is vagueness. He argues that vagueness and trichotomous incomparability are not
compossible, and that it is implausible that there is no vagueness.
12Throughout, I stipulatively use ‘clear’ to mean ‘not-borderline’.
13A classic presentation of indeterminism is Fine (1975). Recall that I am setting aside epistemicism
about vagueness, but little hangs on this.
14Compare with Woodward (2012) on incomplete fictions.
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The argument’s key premise is the collapsing principle:
Collapsing Principle (special version). For any x and y, if it is false that
y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is
Fer than y.15
This principle says that there could not be one-sided indeterminacy, where it is deter-
minate that y is not Fer than x, but indeterminate whether x is Fer than y, or x and y
are equally F.
To see this, suppose that there were such a one-sided case: (i) it is indeterminate
whether Alice is Fer than Brad, but (ii) determinately, Brad is not Fer than Alice.
In other words, it is indeterminate whether Alice is outright Fer than Brad, or merely
equally as F as Brad.
The collapsing principle says that this is incoherent. From (ii), it is false that Brad
is Fer than Alice; from (i) it is not false that Alice is Fer than Brad. Thus, by the
collapsing principle it must be true that Alice is Fer than Brad, and so (i) is incorrect:
the comparison between Alice and Brad in terms of their Fness could not exhibit this
kind of ‘one-sided’ indeterminacy.
I present Broome’s argument in an appendix. This argument has structured much of
the subsequent debate about incommensurability as vagueness, which has focused on
the truth or falsity of the collapsing principle. There has been—to my knowledge—
no independent argument for incommensurability as vagueness. The thesis has been
hostage to the the collapsing principle.
But this is a mistake, for two reasons. First, that principle is vulnerable to a number
of—to my mind—decisive counterexamples. Erik Carlson published the first:
Suppose that we are considering who of Alf and Beth is the better philoso-
pher. Concerning every property that indubitably contributes to good-
ness as a philosopher, we find that they possess it to an equal degree.
However, Alf has greater rhetorical skill than Beth. Does this make Alf
a better philosopher than Beth? It seems that there may well be no defi-
nite answer to this question. […] it is definitely false that Beth is a better
philosopher than Alf.16
This seems a clear case of the ‘one-sided indeterminacy’ that the collapsing principle
forbids. Defenders of the collapsing principle either deny the cogency of such cases,
or restrict its scope to avoid them.17
15Broome (1997), p. 74. I follow Broome in omitting ‘determinately’, here.
16Carlson (2004), p. 223.
17See Carlson (2004) and Elson (2014a) for counterexamples; Broome (2009), Andersson (2015b)
and Constantinescu (2016) offer responses.
7
Second, even if the principle is true and Broome’s argument shows that incommensura-
bility could not be trichotomous incomparability—that (1) is false, in the terminology
of the Appendix—this is not yet to show that incommensurability is vagueness.
It is intuitively plausible but has not yet been shown—to my knowledge—that vague-
ness can account for the main features of incommensurability, or even that it can satisfy
the relatively standard definition of incommensurability provided above. Perhaps this
is simply obvious, but in the remainder of this paper, I argue that it is true, and I defend
the vagueness view without appeal to the collapsing principle.
3 Vagueness without Collapse
The first task is to show how vagueness (specifically: borderlineness) engenders in-
commensurability.
We must distinguish two kinds of borderline case. The most familiar are categorical:
it is indeterminate whether some monadic predicate such as ‘is bald’ or ‘is a heap’
applies. The question ‘is a F?’ has no determinate answer.
In comparative borderline cases, however, the relevant question is, for some predicate
F and two objects a and b, ‘is a Fer than b?’. At least two of ‘a is Fer than b’, ‘b is Fer
than a’, and ‘a and b are equally F’ are indeterminate. According to the vagueness view,
when F is an evaluative predicate, such cases engender or ground incommensurability.
Comparative borderline cases arise in two ways.
First, many predicates aremultidimensional: they depend for their application on mul-
tiple contributory factors, and there is a relative weighting (or ‘exchange rate’) between
them.18 The predicate ‘is bald’ is multidimensional: its application is determined not
only by hair numbers, but colour, thickness, and distribution.
The ‘exchange rate’ terminology makes clear what we are talking about: if we remove
fifty of Hank’s hairs, how much must we thicken his remaining hairs to make him
precisely as bald as before? Similarly, if we take $50 from Hank, then the exchange
rate between US Dollars and Swedish Krona will determine how many Krona we must
give him to render him precisely as wealthy as before. (A downside of the ‘exchange
rate’ and ‘relative weighting’ terminology is that it suggests that the dimensions are
weighted linearly against each other. This need not be so.)
18The ‘exchange rate’ terminology is from Lewis (1994) , p. 479. For discussion of multidimensional
predicates, see Alston (1964), pp. 87–90. I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the
Alston text.
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When the exchange rate is vague, this multidimensionality engenders comparative bor-
derlineness. Suppose that Hank has fewer hairs, but they are thin and widely dis-
tributed over his head. But Henry has more and thicker hairs concentrated in a ring
around his scalp. It may be indeterminate whether Hank is balder, or Henry is balder,
or they are precisely equally bald. Similarly, if the dollar-krona exchange rate were
vague, then it could be indeterminate whether Hank is now richer, poorer, or precisely
as wealthy as before.
Vague exchange rates are ubiquitous. When we are required to score something along
multiple dimensions, we might assign precise weights to those dimensions for calcu-
lative purposes, but this is often an arbitrary exercise. To take an example in the spirit
of Carlson, if we are hiring a philosopher we may have to stipulate that research out-
put contributes exactly one-third of goodness as a candidate for our department. (This
may be done implicitly, by scoring the candidates on a form which has research output,
teaching quality, and administrative experience as the three dimensions of evaluation,
without any specified weighting.)
Second, comparative borderlineness may also be derivative of categorical borderline-
ness, where the application of a comparative predicate depends on the application of a
non-comparative predicate. For example, the fairly ordinary predicate ‘military-aged
man’ has categorical borderline cases. Suppose that any 57 year-old man is border-
line military-aged, and that we wish to compare countries by their military strength,
using the predicate ‘is militarily strong’, the application of which is determined by the
military-aged male population.
Suppose that two countries, A and B, have similar populations, except:
• A has 20,000 more 57 year-old men than B;
• B has 10,000 more 50 year-old men than A.
The 50 year-olds are clearly military-aged, whereas the older men are borderline
military-aged. So it is vague whether A has more or less military-age men than B,
and so it is vague which country is militarily stronger. This comparative borderline
case does not depend on a vague exchange rate, or any multidimensionality. If one
accepts the existence of ordinary categorical borderline cases, one must also accept
their comparative cousins.
On the vagueness view, value incommensurability is simply the evaluative instance of
comparative vagueness. For two options to be incommensurate with respect to some
value V is for them to be a comparative borderline case of Vness: it is indeterminate
which of the trichotomous comparisons obtains between them.
In such a comparative borderline case of an evaluative predicate, it is not determinately
true that one option is better with respect to that value, that the other is better, or that
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they are equally good. None of the trichotomous comparisons determinately applies,
and this satisfies our definition of incommensurability.
But the vagueness view does face a problem here, and one which is exacerbated by the
loss of the collapsing principle. The view claims that all evaluative comparative vague-
ness engenders incommensurability.19 But not all borderline cases look like ‘classic’
instances of incommensurability. It can happen that one of the three trichotomous
comparisons clearly fails to apply. (But only one: if two clearly failed to apply, then
the third would clearly apply, and the case would not be borderline.)
This is perhaps not troubling when it is indeterminate whether a is better or worse than
b, but clear that they are not equally good. (The military strength of A and B is like
this.) Similar decision-theoretic puzzles apply here as in ‘core’ cases of incommensu-
rability.
But what about ‘one-sided’ cases? Carlson’s example of the goodness of philosophers
is like this: it’s indeterminate whether Alf is better than Beth or merely equally as good
as her, but clear that he is not worse than her. This kind of one-sided indeterminacy
would be ruled out by the collapsing principle. But on the vagueness view, this inde-
terminacy is coherent and renders Alf and Beth incommensurate.
We should—whilst acknowledging a certain awkwardness—accept the vagueness
view’s implication that there are such cases of ‘one-sided’ incommensurability.
These cases too raise decision-theoretic puzzles: is it permissible to hire Beth? It
isn’t clear, and a theory of the incommensurate seems to be as good a place as any to
seek an answer to this question.20 It is a virtue of the vagueness view that it brings
such puzzling cases under a single theoretical umbrella.
So—with some awkwardness—vagueness explains the formal structure of incommen-
surability.
4 The Shifted Burden
This is enough to make it a candidate theory of the phenomenon, but why prefer it to
the others? It is at this point that we shift the burden. Where other accounts posit a sui
generis evaluative phenomenon (to my knowledge, none posits trichotomous incom-
parability in non-evaluative comparisons), the vagueness view explains incommensu-
rability as the evaluative manifestation of an everyday—if paradoxical—phenomenon.
19I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting how tendentious this claim is.
20Broome (1997) thinks it would not be permissible, and defends the collapsing principle on this
basis.
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The burden then is this: why accept trichotomous incomparabilism? There are several
strategies available to the opponent. The principal ones are:
(1) The vagueness-denial strategy. Though vagueness would engender something
like incommensurability, evaluative predicates are not (or are not suitably) sus-
ceptible to vagueness.
(2) The indistinguishable phenomena strategy. Though we cannot tease them
apart, both vagueness and trichotomous incomparability occur.
(3) The distinctive phenomena strategy. Though vagueness can generate some-
thing similar to incommensurability, closer investigation shows that it cannot
account for all instances, and thus a further phenomenon (trichotomous incom-
parability) must be posited.
I won’t discuss the indistinguisable phenomena strategy. It seems to me that no evi-
dence could be offered in its support, and that similarly nothing can be said against it,
other than appeals to philosophical parsimony. What grounds could we have to accept
this theory?
The vagueness-denial and distinctive phenomena strategies present more substantial
challenges. I discuss them in turn.
5 Against vagueness-denial
Most ambitiously, the opponent might deny that evaluative predicates are vague in
the way required for incommensurability. I will argue that this is a non-starter, for two
reasons: the supervenience of the evaluative on the non-evaluative, and the application
of standards from the wider vagueness literature.
Unless we’re being really radical, we must accept that there is widespread non-
evaluative vagueness. But the application of an evaluative predicate will often
supervene on that of a non-evaluative predicate. A short argument shows that in such
cases, the evaluative predicate, too, must be vague.
Let the application of the evaluative predicate ‘is stingy’ supervene on that of the
non-evaluative predicate ‘is rich’. The case I have in mind is this: holding constant
everything else (such as charitable donations) whether someone is stingy depends on
how rich she is: for a poor person to donate precisely £5 per month is not stingy, but
for a rich person to do so is.
Now let the non-evaluative ‘is rich’ be vague. Suppose that Pauper is clearly not-rich,
King is clearly rich, Merchant is borderline-rich, and each donates £5 per month to
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charity. King is clearly stingy, and Pauper is clearly not stingy. What about Merchant?
There are three options: either Merchant is clearly stingy, clearly not-stingy, or
borderline-stingy.
If Merchant is clearly stingy, then it is indeterminate whether supervenience has been
violated (because it is indeterminate whether she is stingy despite not being rich). Sim-
ilarly, supervenience is indeterminately-violated if she is clearly not stingy. The only
possibility for preserving supervienience as a clear truth is that Merchant is borderline-
stingy, and so the evaluative predicate ‘is stingy’ is vague.
To put the point more generally but more technically: if we wish to preserve links
between evaluative and non-evaluative predicates as ‘penumbral connections’ in the
words of Fine (1975)—and supervenience suggests that we do—then any vagueness
in one must be matched by vagueness in the other.
The second reason turns on the standards prevalent in philosophical discussions of
(non-evaluative) vagueness. To take a representative example, and focusing on bor-
derlineness, David Braun and Ted Sider claim that ‘an expression is vague if it can
be unclear to a speaker informed of all relevant facts whether the expression correctly
applies.’21
Many evaluative predicates clearly meet this standard. For example, consider the thick
evaluative concept of cowardice.22 What is the precise minimum number of people
one must be prepared to fight in order to be a non-coward? Is it more cowardly to run
from a single man armed with a shotgun, or from a dozen men armed with just their
fists? Whatever standards we use for attributing vagueness in ordinary cases seem to
apply here.
Evaluative vagueness has been a focus of both historical and recent philosophical dis-
cussion.23 Denying that it exists is not a promising way for Trichotomous Incompara-
bilism to discharge the explanatory burden.
5.1 Distribution
A less ambitious—and more promising—approach is to argue that though evaluative
predicates are vague, they are not vague in the right ways or places to account for the
distribution of incommensurability.
Joseph Raz suggests an argument along these lines:
21Braun and Sider (2007) , p.133.
22I’m grateful to Nate Sharadin for the example.
23See, for example, Aqvist (1964) and Dougherty (2014).
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The most important source of incomparability is ‘incomplete’ definition
of the contribution of the criteria to value. […] It is possible that our way
of weighting the different criteria does not establish a different ranking
of all possible combinations. […] There are at least two other sources
of incomparability. First, indeterminacy results from vagueness and the
absence of sharp boundaries which infects language generally and there-
fore apply to value measured by a single criterion as well. These apply
even in cases in which a single descriptive criterion determines the value
of options…24
This is recognisably an attempt to discharge the explanatory burden, by arguing that
vagueness is not the only ‘source’ of the phenomenon. But it can only succeed if
the ‘indeterminacy [that] results from vagueness and the absence of sharp boundaries
which infects language generally …’ must be distinct from the “ ‘incomplete definition’
of the contribution of the criteria to value”.
I have argued that the latter is naturally characterised as a species of the former, once
we consider the possibility of vague exchange rates.
As for the claim that vagueness can arise even without multidimensionality, this is
clearly correct: if the number of military-age men is the sole dimension relevant to the
comparative military strength of countries, then A and B are a comparative borderline-
case of the (unidimensional) predicate ‘is militarily stronger’. Were this to be treated
as an evaluative comparison, then A and B are incommensurate with respect to their
military strength.
I do not find this implausible, for reasons that are now familiar. Most importantly, the
same decision-theoretic issues arise here as in ‘core’ cases of incommensurability. If
one were seeking to join the militarily strongest country, how would one choose in this
case?
Nevertheless, it is true that incommensurability bears a close connection to multidi-
mensionality, and in particular to ‘Pareto-mixed’ comparisons, where one option is
‘better in some ways, and worse in others.’25
This is neatly explained by appeal to vagueness: as we have seen, multidimensionality
means that the different dimensions must be weighted against each other, and this
‘exchange rate’ provides a locus of vagueness, because the exchange rate may be vague.
It is difficult to have a multidimensional predicate that does not engender comparative
borderline cases, because the exchange rate between the dimensions must be wholly
24Raz (1986) , p. 122.
25I am indebted to anonymous reviewers for immensely helpful comments on the argument of this
section.
13
precise to avoid such cases.
Incommensurability is incompatible with a clear lack of Pareto-mixing: if one option
is clearly at least as good along every dimension, then it is clearly at least as good all
things considered.
But even clear Pareto-mixing is not sufficient for incommensurability. In many Pareto-
mixed comparisons, one option is nevertheless better. For example, if Churchill were
only 5 kr more expensive than Florida, but markedly superior in every other way, we
should not hesitate to say that Churchill is better than Florida.
To see how the vagueness view can explain this, let’s construct a toy model of this
comparison. Suppose that the only two dimensions relevant to the choice are price (P)
and adventure (A). Then each holiday will earn a score (S). For example, where the
subscript ‘F’ denotes Florida (and ‘C’ Churchill):
SF = αPF + AF
Here ‘α’ then represents the exchange rate between price and adventure: if α is 0.5,
then adventure is twice as important, and so on.
According to the vagueness view, then, incommensurability will often occur when
the exchange rate α is vague. If it is vague whether α is 0.5 or 0.6, then Churchill
and Florida will be incommensurate if SF > SC when α = 0.5, and SF < SC when
α = 0.6.
But there will be some holidays (those that are both expensive and unexciting) such
that Churchill ‘wins’ on both values of α. This is just the familiar observation that
vague predicates—including comparatives—also have clear cases.
Thus the vagueness view explains why we can have Pareto-mixing without incom-
mensurability most commonly in the following two sorts of cases. First, when one
dimension of comparison is much more important than the others (ie, when α is very
high or very low). Second, when the dimensions are roughly equal in importance, but
one option is much stronger along one dimension, and only slightly weaker than the
other in another dimension.
This is not to say that competing accounts cannot tell a story about the connection
between multidimensionality, Pareto-mixing, and incommensurability. But vagueness
provides a neat theoretical framework for such a story.
The vagueness view also explains why under Pareto-mixing, incommensurability and
betterness and worseness are each common, but equal goodness is rare. It is very
unusual to find a case where though two options are Pareto-mixed, they are precisely
equally good. On the vagueness view, not only α but also the respective values of P
14
and A would have to be fixed precisely, to determinately ‘balance out’ for clear equal
goodness.
5.2 Purely Ordinal Rankings?
I have been arguing that vagueness neatly explains why incommensurability arises,
where it arises. A promising strategy for the opponent would be to present a case
where there is clearly incommensurability, but no locus of vagueness to which it might
be traced.
Sports may seem to offer an example of this. In many sporting competitions there
are several individual events, each of which contributes to the overall rankings: what
if all we have to go on is each competitor’s ordinal rank in each event?26 In such
cases, we would need more than simply a vague ‘exchange rate’ between dimensions
to generate incommensurability via vagueness, since there may be no cardinal values
to be exchanged.27
There is nothing incoherent about such wholly ordinal evaluative structures, which
would give rise to a form of trichotomous incomparability. The question is whether
any actual evaluative practices have this structure. Here are two reasons to doubt that
they do.
First, apparent examples seem to dissolve upon closer inspection. Even in sports, even
when each dimension is genuinely ordinal—for example, finishing position in a race—
cardinal values and an exchange rate are arbitrarily imposed for the purposes of com-
parison: 6 points for first place, and so on.
The structure of such rankings suggest that the underlying evaluation (‘is a better
racer’) has more than just the kind of ordinal content that would ground a counterex-
ample to the vagueness view. In racing for example, it is plausibly an evaluative truth
that the difference between first and second place is more important than that between
thirty-first and thirty-second.
Second, such an evaluative structure would lack the features described in the previous
subsection. On this structure, any Pareto-mixed comparison would be trichotomously
incomparable and therefore incommensurate. But as we have seen, this seems not to
be the case—many Pareto-mixed comparisons are not incommensurate.
26See Sinnott-Armstrong (1985), especially p. 327. I am grateful to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for
this line of objection, and for the sporting example.
27See Okasha (2011) for an intriguingly parallel discussion of weighting competing theoretical
virtues in scientific theory-choice.
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I therefore tentatively conclude that the vagueness-denial strategy has not been suc-
cessfully carried out: there seems to be vagueness ‘available’ to account for cases of
incommensurability.
6 Vagueness and Arbitrary Choice
The distinctive phenomena strategy has been pursued by Ruth Chang, who has influen-
tially argued that vagueness views cannot account for distinctive features of one-shot
choices involving incommensurate comparisons, which she calls ‘superhard.’28 Chang
argues that disagreement in the face of incommensurability is subject to substantive
dispute, but disagreement in the face of vagueness can be stipulated away.
In effect, she accepts the Arbitrary Choice Thesis for vagueness, but not for the incom-
mensurate:
in borderline cases, it is perfectly permissible to resolve the indetermi-
nacy in favour of application or not by arbitrary stipulation, but in su-
perhard cases, resolution of the perplexity in context-free cases is not
permissibly given by arbitrary stipulation.29
If this is right, then incommensurability and vagueness have different resolution con-
ditions in one-shot cases, and incommensurability could not be vagueness. She intro-
duces a neat thought experiment, to abstract from any potentially distorting context.
Jack is playing a game, and must sort people into a ‘bald’ or a ‘non-bald’ pile. Players
of the game are fully informed, Herbert is borderline-bald, and Jack must choose a
pile for him; Jack sorts Herbert into the ‘bald’ pile. Then:
What is crucial is that the sorting decision is perfectly arbitrary; he could
just as well have flipped a coin to determine how Herbert was to be sorted
[…] if we add another player, Jill, who happens to sort Herbert into the
‘not bald’ pile, Jack and Jill have no real disagreement; their ‘disagree-
ment’ is simply a clash of arbitrary stipulations in the face of indeter-
minate application. Of course, this is not to say that the answer to the
question, Is Herbert bald, is given by a coin flip, for the answer to that
question is that it is indeterminate whether he is. The point here is only
that a resolution of this indeterminacy can be appropriately given by a
28This is not Chang’s only use of the distinctive phenomena strategy; she also appeals to phenomeno-
logical considerations. But I think Ryan Wasserman’s response to this is decisive, so I won’t discuss it
here. See Wasserman (2004) p. 398.
29Chang (2002) pp. 679–688.
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coin flip. In general, the resolution of borderline-cases can always be a
matter of arbitrary stipulation.30
If ‘resolution’ is interpreted in terms of deciding what to do, then Chang’s claims
here are clearly correct. If it is indeterminate which pile Herbert must go into, but
determinate that he must go into one, then what is there to do, but stipulate arbitrarily?
By hypothesis, there is no determinate reason to choose one over the other. Whatever
you do, it will be indeterminate whether you have put him in the correct pile.
Here ‘arbitrary stipulation’ need not be limited to random picking, such as coin flips.
One can adopt a general policy to deal with borderline cases, such as putting the tall
borderline-bald men into one pile, and the not-tall in another. The point is that the rules
of the game do not specify into which pile Herbert should go, so we must appeal to
something ‘outside the rules’, so to speak. This will be arbitrary from the perspective
of the rules.
Chang claims that when facing a superhard case, we need not resort to such arbitrary
stipulation:
The resolution of perplexity in superhard cases is very different in nature.
Suppose that Jack is confronted with the superhard case involving Mozart
and Michelangelo. The rules of the game require him to put the ordered
pair in one pile or the other … what is crucial is that his decision is not
properly arbitrary; it is not true that the could just as well have a flipped
a coin to resolve the perplexity. If Jill puts the pair in (the other pile),
Jack and Jill have a genuine disagreement over whether Mozart has the
greater creativity—this is no clash of arbitrary decisions but a substantive
disagreement in which arguments can be brought to bear.31
We must admit that there is a difference here. But I will argue that it arises not because
one case is superhard and the other vague. Instead, superhardness is vagueness, and
the cases differ in some other way.
If the Mozart/Michelangelo comparison is superhard, then the disagreement between
Jack and Jill cannot be substantive in the way Chang suggests. If Mozart and Michelan-
gelo are incommensurate, and Jack and Jill are fully-informed, then they will agree that
the case is superhard, and thus that it is not true that Mozart is more creative, or that
Michelangelo is more creative, or that they are equally creative.
But then how could resolution be a matter of substantive debate between them? Sup-
pose that Jack thinks that it would be better to choose Mozart, solely on the grounds
of creativity: does that not imply that he thinks that Mozart is more creative? It is
30Chang (2002), p. 684.
31Chang (2002) , pp. 684–5.
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incoherent to think that Mozart and Michelangelo are incommensurate with respect to
creativity, but that on substantive grounds of creativity, Mozart should be put in the
‘more creative’ pile: why don’t those substantive grounds render him more creative
than Michaelangelo, and not merely incommensurate with him?
In general, it’s untenable for Jack and Jill to agree that the Mozart/Michaelangelo
comparison is superhard, yet to have a ‘substantive dispute’ about how they should be
classified.
Note that this is not a case of them thinking that there is a hidden (trichotomous) fact
of the matter, and perhaps having substantive grounds for judging it more probable
that Mozart is better than that Michaelangelo is better. This is also incompatible with
judging them trichotomously incomparable.
Firm intuitions are scarce here, but to switch examples, it seems plainly incoherent
for Katie to think both that (i) the two holidays are incommensurate as a holiday for
her, and neither is better; and (ii) that on substantive grounds concerning which is a
better holiday for her, she ought to choose Churchill, and that were her travel partner
to choose Florida, they would have a substantive disagreement. Instead, Simon Black-
burn seems to be correct that incommensurability often demands arbitrary stipulation,
and that ‘both common sense and high theory tell us how to handle it. The agent has
to plump for one alternative.’32
Ryan Wasserman rightly claims that Chang ‘has put her finger on a very common
intuition here …[in evaluative cases] I find myself hesitant to conclude that there is
no relevant fact of the matter.’33 But this is perhaps overly concessive to the intution:
to judge a pair incommensurate is to judge that there is no such (determinate) fact, if
that means that none of the trichotomous comparisons obtains.
There is of course much more room for debate aboutwhether the Mozart/Michelangelo
pair is superhard than there is in the baldness case, for several reasons. There is
more at work in the complex notion of creativity than in the largely observational
‘is bald’. As Cristian Constantinescu and others have pointed out, there are many
differences between the cases.34 Whereas ‘is bald’ is a monadic predicate that applies
to individuals, ‘is more creative than’ is a dyadic comparative predicate that applies to
pairs. The application of ‘is bald’ is determined by perhaps a few dimensions—hair
number, distribution, colour, thickness—where the first and second are by far the
32Blackburn (2010) , p. 50.
33Wasserman (2004) , p. 400.
34See Constantinescu (2012) . But his own preferred explanation—that ‘the application of vague
predicates can seem less arbitrary not because those predicates are any less vague, but simply because
it matter to us more in those contexts how we apply the relevant predicates’ (p. 62)—can’t be the whole
story. Stipulatively, here we are dealing with a game, which rules out contextual factors like importance.
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most important; the application of ‘is more creative than’ is certainly determined by
many more dimensions (there may not even be a determinate list, if the predicate has
‘open texture’). And whilst ‘is bald’ is normally a nonevaluative predicate, ‘is more
creative than’ is straightforwardly evaluative.
The cases have little in common, other than that Jack and Jill face perplexity about the
application of a predicate. This pair of cases is not a good test for whether the presence
of superhardness (as opposed to mere vagueness) changes the resolution conditions.
A genuine test will have to hold as much else fixed as possible.
In the United States, admission to most selective undergraduate colleges is determined
by several dimensions, including exam scores, essays, letters of recommendation, ex-
tracurricular activities such as sport and volunteering, and money.35 Jess and John are
paid to play a game: they must select candidates for a given university. They must put
candidates into one of two piles: accept, or reject. They have one slot left, and two
remaining candidates, a and b. The candidates are roughly equal in most respects, but
for the following differences: a has test scores about 5% better; b has done somewhat
more hours of volunteering. In light of this, is is not clear who should get the slot.
There are two ways that Jess and John’s game might be run. The first leaves significant
room for them to exercise judgement:
Admissions as Superhard. Jess and John have instructions to ‘admit the
best candidates’.
They are working to decide who is the better candidate, which is a plainly evaluative
task: a is better in one way, and b is better in another, but which is better overall? The
choice is superhard. Since Jess and John are in an institutional role, and have no other
incentives either way, in certain circumstances their choices will be determined purely
by the evaluative considerations. They are making a good-faith effort to admit the best
candidates.
But the game may also be structured so as to involve vagueness:
Admissions as Vague. Jess and John are working from an instruction
sheet. The sheet contains the instruction, ‘admit candidates with higher
test scores, unless they have done substantially fewer volunteering hours’.
Under the new management, Jess and John are explicitly told to avoid evaluative judge-
ments about who is the ‘better’ candidate. Instead they are simply judging whether a
certain multidimensional predicate applies, in a fairly mechanical way: scoring candi-
dates along multiple dimensions, and calculating an overall score according to some
35Compare with Seung and Bonevac (1992) , pp.806–809. I’m grateful to anonymous reviewers for
comments on a previous version of this case.
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specified weighting. But ‘substantially fewer volunteering hours’ is vague: depending
on context, 10 hours over a year might be borderline-substantial, and a difference of
0.01 hours seems liable to ground a sorites on ‘substantially fewer’.
If the a/b pair is a comparative borderline case of the criterion ‘higher scores without
substantially fewer volunteer hours’, then then it is vague what the instructions require.
This might be compared to a case of legal vagueness.
Admissions as Superhard and Admissions as Vague are structurally similar. If Chang’s
resolutional argument were correct, the differences she describes—that in one case
resolution is arbitrary and stipulative, in the other case substantive—should arise here
too. But they don’t seem to. Intuitively, in both versions of Admissions, arbitrary
choice is permissible, even required. What other way is there to proceed? In both
cases, the Jess and John agree that the rules of the game do not determine which
candidate to admit. How are they to fill the slot if they do not go ‘beyond the rules’ by
choosing arbitrarily in some sense?
No striking difference in acceptable resolution methods between the superhard and the
borderline seems to manifest here. The best explanation of this is that resolution in the
Mozart/Michelangelo case is also arbitrary, and any appearance to the contrary can be
explained by the special features of that case.
Incommensurability and vagueness both seem to bring arbitrariness. Indeed, the
vagueness view promises to (partially) explain the permissibility of arbitrary choice
in the face of incommensurability, because choice under incommensurability simple
is choice under vagueness. The latter phenomenon arises otherwise, whether from
vague utility or credence functions, or from vagueness concerning such matters as
personal identity. Nearly all current discussion of rational choice under vagueness
supports the permissibility of random, arbitrary, or ‘capricious’ choice. Some views
even require that choice be truly randomised.36 (If the vagueness view is correct,
many of these situations involve incommensurability.)
There may be more ‘broadly pragmatic’ reasons to be wary of coin-flipping when
the moral or evaluative stakes are high. Perhaps coin-flipping would fail to show due
deference to morality, or in cases of legal vagueness, to the law. But it doesn’t fol-
low that there is a non-arbitrary way to proceed. As Simon Blackburn notes, some
such arbitrary picking methods—such as cards, or drawing straws—do carry an air of
seriousness.37 The culturally-contingent connotations of some methods of arbitrary
stipulation do not amount to evidence that arbitrary stipulation is per se inappropri-
ate.
36Williams (2014).
37Blackburn (2010) , p. 50.
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The Vagueness View offers a plausible decision theory in ‘one-shot’ choices between
incommensurate options: choose arbitrarily.
7 Conclusion: Incommensurability and Vagueness
I have outlined a view according to which all evaluative comparative vagueness (specif-
ically: borderlineness) engenders incommensurability, and all incommensurability is
evaluative comparative vagueness. The view is defended without appeal to the col-
lapsing principle.
More broadly, I have argued that vagueness offers a parsimonious account of incom-
mensurability, and that the vagueness view’s fate need not be tied to the collapsing
principle. Moreover, the opponent faces the following question: if it is true that there
is widespread evaluative vagueness, and that—as I have argued—this engenders a phe-
nomenon much like incommensurability, then where is it all? Why posit a sui generis
evaluative phenomenon when vagueness will do?
Once we look at incommensurability and vagueness through this lens, we see the enor-
mous structural and theoretical similarities between them. Incommensurability engen-
ders phenomenal instability, and so does vagueness. It can be difficult to hold in one’s
head the verdicts that make up a judgement of incommensurability (a is neither at least
as good as b nor worse than b, but a and b are properly compared); it can be difficult to
hold in one’s head the verdicts that make up a judgement of borderlineness (Herbert
is a man with hair on his head, but he is neither bald nor not-bald). Even the range of
theoretical options—indeterminacy and eliminativism/epistemicism—is similar.
But like everyone else, I lack a convincing theory of value-pumping. It seems that
mainstream Trichotomous Incomparabilism must simply stipulate restrictions against
it. Here, for example, is Chang:
The rational permissibility of choosing either of two items on a par, then,
must be constrained by one’s other choices. If one chose B when of-
fered a choice between A+ and B, one is thereby rationally prohibited
from choosing A when offered a choice between B and A. […] The air
of paradox is dispelled once we see that the sense in which it may be
rationally impermissible to choose one of two items on a par depends
on understanding the rationality of choice against a background of other
choices.38
38Chang (2005), p. 347.
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Without argument, such a constraint seems unacceptably ad hoc (notice that similar
constraints do not apply to choice under betterness, worseness, and equal goodness).
On the vagueness view, however, decision-making under incommensurability is as-
similated to that under vagueness. This is philosophically fruitful: the phenomenon
of value-pumping occurs in many cases of rational choice under vagueness. These
include Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, and ‘vague projects’, which have
imprecise satisfaction conditions.39 Vagueness at least provides a framework for the-
orising about the problem.
The vagueness view lacks a decisive advantage over Trichotomous Incomparabilism
on this issue. But the vagueness view is superior along several other dimensions, and
seems to be worse along none. So its denial requires a justification.
This argument of this paper does not promise to be decisive in the way that Broome’s
does. The collapsing principle implies that trichotomous incomparability and vague-
ness are not compossible; the present argument has a somewhat similar structure, but
does not rule out ‘cohabitation’ between the phenomena. Instead, having both seems
unparsimonious. Rather than saying that one must choose, my claim is that we have
good—and undefeated—reason to think that there is no trichotomous incomparability,
and that incommensurability is vagueness.
8 Appendix: Broome’s Argument
To formulate the argument, we use a ‘standard configuration’, where some object (the
standard) is compared with a range of objects of some other kind. Let us suppose that
are comparing careers, and the relevant virtues include—but are not limited to—salary.
By way of reductio, suppose that there is an instance of trichotomous incomparability:
(1) The philosophy job A (the standard) is trichotomously incomparable with a
range B100, ...,B150 of banking jobs.
Here the subscripts denote the salary of the banking job (which are otherwise identi-
cal). Suppose (also for reductio) that there are borderline cases of such trichotomous
incomparability:
(2) It is indeterminate whether the banking job B151 is trichotomously incompara-
ble with A, or outright better than A.
39See Quinn (1990); Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012); Williams (2014); Moss (2015); Rinard (2015);
Elson (2016).
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Then it is not false that B151 is better than A. But it is false that A is better than B151,
because B151 is better than B150, and it is false that A is better than B150. (Intuitively:
if the philosophy job is not better than a given banking job, it is certainly not better
than that same banking job with a higher salary.)
Applying the collapsing principle, it is true that B151 is better than A. Reductio: B151
could not have been borderline-incommensurate with A after all.
Thus (1), (2), and the collapsing principle form an inconsistent triad. No region of
trichotomous incomparability could have ‘vague edges’ of this sort, because the col-
lapsing principle rules out borderline cases of ‘is trichotomously incomparable with
A’.
Assuming the truth of the collapsing principle, (1) or (2) must be abandoned. Since it’s
highly implausible that there could not be vagueness at the edges of any trichotomous
incomparability, Broome argues, we should abandon (1), the claim of trichotomous
incomparability.
References
Alston, W P. 1964. Philosophy of language. Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy
Series. Prentice-Hall.
Andersson, Henrik. 2015a. “Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regard-
ing Chang’s Chaining Argument.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
doi:10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5.
———. 2015b. “Propping Up the Collapsing Principle.” Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 18 (3): 475–86. doi:10.1007/s10677-014-9533-9.
Aqvist, Lennart. 1964. “Vagueness and Value.” Ratio 6 (2): 121–27.
Blackburn, Simon. 2010. “Dilemmas: Dithering, Plumping, and Grief.” In Practical
Tortoise Raising, edited by Simon Blackburn, 47–63. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548057.001.0001.
Braun, David, and Theodore Sider. 2007. “Vague, so Untrue.” Nous 41 (2). Blackwell
Publishing Inc: 133–56. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00641.x.
Broome, John. 1997. “Is incommensurability vagueness?” In Incommensurability,
Incomparability, and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang, 67–89. Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
———. 2009. “Reply to Rabinowicz.” Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 412–17.
23
doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00175.x.
Carlson, Erik. 2004. “Broome’s Argument against Value Incomparability.” Utilitas
16 (2): 220–24. doi:10.1017/S0953820804000548.
———. 2010. “Parity Demystified.” Theoria 76 (2). Blackwell Publishing Ltd: 119–
28. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01063.x.
Chang, Ruth. 2002. “The Possibility of Parity.” Ethics 112 (4): 659–88. http://www.
jstor.org/stable/10.1086/339673.
———. 2005. “Parity, Interval Value, and Choice.” Ethics 115 (2): 331–50.
doi:10.1086/426307.
Constantinescu, Cristian. 2012. “Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.” Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1): 57–70. doi:10.1007/s10677-011-9269-8.
———. 2016. “Vague Comparisons.” Ratio.
Dougherty, Tom. 2014. “Vague Value.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 89 (2): 352–72. doi:10.1111/phpr.12026.
Elson, Luke. 2014a. “Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle.” Utilitas 26
(01): 51–60. doi:10.1017/S095382081300023X.
———. 2014b. “Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for Parity a Sorites?”
Ethics 124 (3): 557–71. doi:10.1086/674844.
———. 2016. “Tenenbaum and Raffman on Vague Projects, the Self-Torturer, and
the Sorites.” Ethics 126 (2): 474–88. doi:10.1086/683533.
Fine, Kit. 1975. “Vagueness, truth and logic.” Synthese 30 (3): 265–300.
Gert, Joshua. 2004. “Value and Parity.” The University of Chicago Press.
doi:10.1086/381697.
Lewis, David. 1994. “Humean Supervenience Debugged.” Mind, New series, 103
(412). Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association: pp.473–490. http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/2254396.
Moss, Sarah. 2015. “Credal Dilemmas.” Noûs 49 (4): 665–83. doi:10.1111/nous.12073.
Okasha, Samir. 2011. “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow.” Mind
120 (477): 83–115. doi:10.1093/mind/fzr010.
Quinn, Warren S. 1990. “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.” Philosophical Studies 59
(1). Kluwer Academic Publishers: 79–90. doi:10.1007/BF00368392.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek. 2008. “Value relations.” Theoria 74 (1): 18–49.
24
doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00008.x.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. “Value incommensurability: some preliminaries.” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 86: 117–34.
Regan, Donald. 1997. “Value, Comparability, and Choice.” In Incommensurability,
Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
Rinard, Susanna. 2015. “A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.” Philoso-
phers’ Imprint 15 (7): 1–16.
Seung, T K, and Daniel Bonevac. 1992. “Plural Values and Indeterminate Rankings.”
Ethics 102 (4): 799–813. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381555.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1985. “Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.” Ameri-
can Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4): 321–29.
Sousa, Ronald B de. 1974. “The good and the true.” Mind 83 (332). JSTOR: 534–51.
Tenenbaum, Sergio, and Diana Raffman. 2012. “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the
Self-Torturer.” Ethics 123 (1): 86–112. doi:10.1086/667836.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2004. “Indeterminacy, Ignorance and the Possibility of Par-
ity.” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1). Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc.: 391–403.
doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00034.x.
Williams, J Robert G. 2014. “Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.” Philosophers’
Imprint 14 (4): 1–34.
Woodward, Richard. 2012. “Fictionalism and incompleteness.” Nous 46: 781–90.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00826.x.
25
